Application of the Concept of Supply Chain Reliability for an Availability Assessment of Inland Waterway Systems by Gast, Johannes M & Wehrle, Rebecca
22nd Cambridge International Manufacturing Symposium – Full Papers and Extended Abstracts 
University of Cambridge, 27th – 28th September 2018 
 
1 
 
Application of the Concept of Supply Chain Reliability for an Availability 
Assessment of Inland Waterway Systems 
Johannes M. Gast a, Rebecca Wehrle b 
a 4flow AG, Berlin, Germany 
b Institute for Industrial Production, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, GER 
j.gast@4flow.de, rebecca.wehrle@kit.edu 
Abstract 
The concept of Supply Chain Reliability has received some attention in recent years due to 
disruptions that affect Supply Chains and endanger business continuity. This paper examines the 
current state of the literature on Supply Chain Reliability. The literature’s underlying concept of 
Reliability Theory is applied to assess the availability of a restrictive infrastructure network 
based on empirical failure data in a case study about the West-German canal system. 
Furthermore, the availability of transport flows inside the system is calculated. The model 
analyses the state of the canal system regarding transportation flows by calculating its 
component availability. The model is generalisable for inland waterways and results in a 
quantitative indicator for the risk assessment of Supply Chain Disruptions and Supply Chain 
Resilience. This indicator, the reliability value, can be integrated into the Supply Chain Risk 
Management of affected organisations and used as a parameter of procurement models. 
Keywords: Supply Chain Reliability; Infrastructure Availability; Supply Chain Disruption; 
Reliability Theory; Inland Waterway Transportation 
1. Introduction  
Supply Chains (SC) face growing threats of disruptions due to external events such as disasters, conflicts, 
market volatility, and policy-making. The organisations of the SCs need to recognise what needs to be 
done to assure production in certain levels and to estimate the maximum tolerable recovery period after 
a disruption occurs (Faertes, 2015). Global sourcing and global selling, as well as lean management 
practices, have exacerbated the threat of disruption even further by increasing SC Vulnerability 
(Christopher, 2016). As a result, disruptive events can have severe business consequences. These 
consequences are not limited to one company but companies further downstream of the disrupted SC, 
too (Merz et al., 2009). 
Access to inland waterways allows industries like chemical industrial parks or power plants to procure 
high volumes of low-cost chemicals and materials as well as the logistics handling of some dangerous 
goods and large machinery. However, a SC dependent on waterway infrastructure becomes subject to 
the functionality and availability of the infrastructure, which is not always given, i.e. in case of extreme 
weather effects: BASF SE wrote off more than EUR 200 million because of supply disruptions directly 
related to the historic 2018 low-tides of the river Rhine (BASF SE, 2019). Marl and other ports were not 
accessible for almost two weeks in February 2012 due to ice-coverage of the canal “Datteln-Hamm-
Kanal” (ELWIS-database, 2019). SC disruptions in chemical industrial parks have notable impacts for 
many downstream industries because one finds their products nearly everywhere. Because a disruption 
at the chemical industry park located in Marl caused a shortage of a necessary component for the global 
automotive industry in 2012, the site was identified as a nexus supplier hidden in various multi-tier SCs 
(Yan et al., 2015). The examples above highlight the dependency of certain SCs on the availability of 
inland waterways. 
Anticipating and mitigating the impact of disruptive events is part of SC Risk Management. Next to the 
likelihood of a risk event, the event duration and SC capabilities to cope with the event, i.e. by modal 
shift or safety stocks, need to be considered as part of SC Risk Management, too. The assessment of SC 
Reliability is capable of applying quantitative methods from Reliability Theory that capture the 
configuration of the network, the current state of the network, and time dynamics, thereby addressing the 
shortcomings of qualitative SC Risk Management models (Gast, 2019).  In order to contribute to the field 
of Supply Chain Reliability and to obtain a quantitative indicator of the risk associated with Inland 
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Waterway Transportation, this paper presents a case study on the availability of the West-German canal 
system by: 
• assessing the availability of inland waterway infrastructure in a case study about the West-
German canal system. 
The case study was chosen due to the following reasons: on the one hand, this system handles the second 
most goods volume transported on inland waterways in Germany, after the river Rhine, and acts as a 
connection to other German canals. On the other hand, ships have to pass multiple locks which are 
occasionally undergoing unscheduled maintenance, thereby reducing the availability of the system. 
The paper is divided into five sections: First, this paper summarises published literature on SC Reliability 
and presents existing concepts, models and applications. In the following section, the paper develops the 
methodology by using appropriate methods from Reliability Theory. Then, the developed methodology 
is applied to assess the availability of the West-German canal system. Afterwards, the paper presents and 
discusses the obtained results. Last, the paper puts the results into the perspective of SCs that depend on 
the availability of infrastructure and sketches further research steps. 
2. Literature Review 
The following section provides an overview of previous attempts to quantify SC Reliability. As one of 
the first, journal-published, research contributions in that field, Miman and Pohl (2008) argue that 
mission fulfilment has priority for SCs, which encounter unforeseen events, and thus costs should be 
considered secondarily; the authors propose a model of Network Reliability in a real-world logistics 
system to ensure that supply always meets demand in case of SC Disruptions. Moreover, the authors 
consider higher cost levels and costs of inventory holding to ensure that the routing, in case of multiple 
options, prefers more reliable node connections. However, the inland waterway routes, as well as 
capacities for modal shifts, are limited. Hence, infrastructure networks require resilience with emphasis 
on the recovery period (Hosseini and Barker, 2016). 
Ohmori and Yoshimoto (2013) suggest that risk can be seen as the counterpart of reliability and propose 
the concept of Network Reliability as a tool in order to address the shortcomings of SC risk management. 
Furthermore, considering the features of network reliability, resilience got introduced into the context of 
SC Reliability, answering the question, “whether SC processes can be recovered by the specified target 
time” (Ohmori and Yoshimoto, 2013) — resembling the aspect of maintainability in Reliability Theory. 
Finally, Ha et al. (2018) structurally derive a definition of SC Reliability. The authors point out in their 
conducted literature review that the literature on SC Reliability is scarce and does not contain a definition 
so far that captures time, network configuration, and capacity throughput. On that account, they translate 
the mathematical definition of reliability of an arbitrary component system into the terminology of SC. 
The literature covers both the dimension of disruptions (contingency logistics) and the logistic process 
dimension of delivery reliability (service levels). For most parts, the literature provides concepts that are 
not applied in real-world logistics systems (Gast, 2019; Ha et al., 2018). However, the literature on SC 
Reliability has not yet provided an attempt to calculate the availability of a SC system with consideration 
of recovery time (~resilience) from empirical data. Furthermore, SC literature points out three main 
limitations to the application of SC Reliability next to the lack of applications in case studies (Gast, 
2019): 
• difficulties in defining system boundaries in which to calculate reliability values. 
• the availability of failure data in order to derive reliability parameters. 
• the complexity of a network with n nodes poses computational limitations, as enumeration and 
decomposition algorithms with exponential runtime (O(2n)) have to be applied. 
The main limitations of applying SC Reliability, are not present in assessing the infrastructure availability 
of the West-German canal system, because: First, the system in scope consists of four canals and 14 
locks; thus, computational limitations do not apply. Second, the waterway infrastructure and canal entry 
and exit points are well-defined system boundaries. Third, historical data about the failure of 
infrastructure objects are available. 
The next section presents the methodology that is used to analyse the SC Reliability of SCs, which cargo 
flows move through the West-German canal system. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology of this paper uses and presents basic models from Reliability Theory, which the 
literature of SC Reliability mostly considers, too. Reliability Theory is well-studied in the past decades 
and mainly applied in construction and manufacturing (see Ebeling, 2017). Then, the model is applied to 
the West-German canal system and used to quantify the availability of the inland waterway structure. 
3.1. Context from Reliability Theory 
Reliability is defined to be the probability that a component or system will perform a required function 
for a given period when used under stated operating conditions” (Ebeling, 2017). Time is not inherent to 
SC Risk Management; though, time is an inherent attribute of reliability. Both statements are expressed 
in equation (1): 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟{𝑡 ≤ 𝑇} = 𝑒-.(/)    (1) 
where R(t) is the reliability level expressed as the probability Pr{T ≥ t} that the system is in a non-
failure state at time t, in a given period T, and λ(t) is the HRF that influences failure likelihood and the 
distribution of failures. The HRF can be obtained from empirical data and their distribution or with 
scientific knowledge about the failure modes. Another essential equation is the Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF) defined in equation (2). The MTTF returns the expected point of time in which a failure occurs 
with a likelihood of 50%. 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑅(𝑡)	𝑑𝑡<=     (2) 
Analogously to equation (2), equation (3) defines the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR): 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 = ∫ 𝑀(𝑡)	𝑑𝑡<=     (3) 
where M(t) is the Repair Function, which describes the behaviour of an offline component. MMTR is 
the probability that the repair of a component is performed in a given period. The following relationship 
given by equation (4) applies for the HRF mentioned above: 𝐻𝑅𝐹	 = 	−𝑙𝑛[(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 −𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅)‘]    (4) 
Ebeling (2017) defines Availability as the probability that a component or system is performing its 
required function at a given point in time when used under stated operating conditions. Equation (5) 
expresses the Availability of a component using MTBF and MTTR defined above: 𝐴 = HIJKHIJKLHIIM    (5) 
Availability can be described in qualitative terms or quantitative terms as a probability, depending on 
whether MTBF and MTTR only contain the expected value for a period T or also information about the 
failure distribution.  
The distribution of failure likelihoods can vary significantly depending on the failure mode in focus, 
system properties, environmental parameters and loads (Ebeling, 2017). If not enough information about 
the distribution is available, the principle of maximum entropy applies, meaning that the normal 
distribution can be assumed, because its application requires the least information (Pinto et al., 2013). 
From the Reliability Function of a component, the Reliability Structure Function can be obtained to 
calculate the reliability value of a system. Systems are sets of elements that stand in a mutual relationship 
with each other. A component of a system can also be a system, in that case, referred to as a subsystem. 
In the following, the Structure Function is described, which finds application in almost all SC Reliability 
models to this date. The function allows expressing complex systems with only one parameter: their 
reliability. The Structure Function assumes that there are only two states for a component xi as described 
in equation (6): xO = 	 P1				if	the	iVW	component	works0								if	the	iVW	component	fails    (6) 
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𝜙(𝑥) = 	𝜙(𝑥d, 𝑥f, … , 𝑥h)    (7) 
The Reliability Structure Function ϕ(x) of a system with n-components, as defined in equation (7), 
incorporates equation (6) and assesses whether the whole system is in a working or failing state. The 
assessment result depends on the relationship of the components; e.g., if the two components in a two-
component system are in series, system reliability is calculated by the product of their Reliability 
Function, and if the first component fails, the system fails. If set in parallel, both components have to fail 
in order for the system to fail because redundancy exists. If knowledge about the offline time is available 
through the MTTR, the information about the configuration in the Reliability Structure Function can be 
used to assess the availability of a path through the system (Ebeling, 2017). 
The following section outlines the scope of the availability assessment using the presented context. 
3.2. Availability assessment of an infrastructure network in a case study 
The German waterway authority pronounces timestamped, binding notifications regarding the German 
inland waterways (“Nachrichten für die Binnenschifffahrt”). The notifications are archived and 
accessible online (see ELWIS-database, 2019). For this analysis, 2,199 observations containing 
information about restrictions, closures, and their respective durations were collected from the database 
and syntactically edited. In a second step, observations regarding infrastructure objects that are not 
related to the canals’ locks or the waterway of the canals were dropped because their impact on the 
availability of the canal system could not be fully determined. Third, suspended notices were excluded, 
too. The filtered dataset now contains 1,088 observations of closures of waterways and locks in the West-
German canal system since 2006.  
Figure 1 outlines the network configuration of the West-German canal system with its canals “Wesel-
Datteln-Kanal“ (WDK), “Dortmund-Ems-Kanal” (DEK), “Rhein-Herne-Kanal” (RHK), and “Datteln-
Hamm-Kanal” (DHK). The canal locks mainly possess two lock chambers (The network configuration 
in this paper considers the lock “Ruhrschleuse Duisburg” as the second chamber of the lock “Duisburg 
Meiderich). 
 
Figure 1. Network of the West-German canal system. 
The canal system would not be available if all locks of a single two-chamber lock or the waterway are 
closed.  
4. Results 
Table 1 below presents the calculated summary of reliability parameters for each object, which are 
associated with an id and the number n of available observations between March 2006 and June 2019. 
The MTTR and MTBF are given next to their respective Standard Deviations σ(•), and are formatted in 
days [d]. The percental availability of each infrastructure object is given in the last column. Two-chamber 
locks are assumed to be a two-component system that is set in parallel and has an independent failure 
distribution. 
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Table 1. Calculation of reliability parameters for the West-German canal system. 
Id Object n MTBF σ(MTBF) MTTR σ(MTTR) Availability 
1 DEK 174 25.54 32.09 2.39 10.36 0.9144 
2 DHK 46 97.64 115.87  3.07 10.64 0.9695 
3 RHK 182 24.70 28.53 0.78 2.05 0.9694 
4 WDK 65 66.55 75.88 0.69 0.83 0.9897 
5 Ahsen 46 88.90 198.90 14.08 63.72 0.9813 
6 Datteln 51 82.76 218.23 3.24 7.16 0.9986 
7 Dorsten 49 85.07 195.93 8.98 41.50 0.9909 
8 D.-Meiderich 54 68.20 86.41 14.05 85.92 0.9408 
9 Flaesheim 40 101.10 134.44 4.88 13.32 0.9979 
10 Friedrichsfeld 96 45.58 63.01 3.64 11.49 0.9945 
11 Gelsenkirchen 38 120.59 183.92 5.50 9.85 0.9981 
12 Hamm* 21 184.80 245.44 4.62 4.14 0.9756 
13 Henrichenburg* 41 107.47 169.98 3.27 8.86 0.9705 
14 Herne-Ost 22 172.82 245.13 13.32 44.65 0.9949 
15 Hünxe 63 67.37 134.70 5.59 14.73 0.9941 
16 Münster 6 711.80 1,025.73 8.06 7.55 0.9999 
17 Oberhausen 51 72.44 202.41 20.15 68.90 0.9526 
18 Wanne-Eickel* 43 103.50 136,55 2.60 7.68 0.9755 
*locks with only one-chamber  
Table 1 shows the results of the calculation of reliability parameters for each object. Now, the Reliability 
Structure Function for a route through this component system can be derived. The following Structure 
Function in equation (9) represents the system availability that transportation from the river Rhine (R) 
can access the port of Dortmund through the lock “Henrichenburg” (H). 𝐴M→k = 0.8774	 = 	𝑅d ∗ 	𝑅dr ∗ (1 − (1 − 𝑅stu ∗ 𝑅stu_wxyz{) ∗ (1 − 𝑅Mku ∗ 𝑅Mku_wxyz{))    (8) 
where 𝑅tku_wxyz{,	𝑅Mku_wxyz{ are the respective products of the canal locks’ Reliability Functions. 
Equation (8) states that the availability for a given period is expected to be 87.74%. 
5. Discussion 
The calculated Reliability Functions are based on empirical data but were subject to assumptions. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova coefficient does not validate the assumption that the failure events follow a 
normal distribution for two-third of the objects, thus – in the context of a reliability assessment - the 
principle of maximum entropy needs to be applied. The Standard Deviation is rather high as a result of 
outliers due to disruptive events, i.e. an accident damaging one chamber-gate at the lock “Duisburg-
Meiderich” resulting in a downtime phase of 632 days. The availability of the DEK is low not only 
because of major disruptive events like the collapse of a canal bridge at the DEK but also due to events 
like rowing regattas. For the latter, notifications are given far in advance to allow affected organisations 
to adapt. Further works would be able to elaborate on the failure distribution with means of Reliability 
Theory: i.e. the distribution of failures due to nature is dependent on the current weather and season.  
This paper aimed to assess the navigability of the West-German canal way and did not further examine 
the varying impacts of failure states: for example, the closure of the large-chamber of a lock could result 
up-to hours of waiting time for cargo vessels and the largest vessel classes would not be able to enter the 
canal anymore. In general, the model did not consider different states of the system, i.e. the reduced 
reliability if access to a specific lock-chamber is already restricted. Multi-state models from Network 
Reliability analysis may be consulted to calculate the Reliability Function; those models are also capable 
of capturing risk dependencies (see Pérez-Rosés, 2018). 
Nonetheless, this paper derives a quantitative indicator that not only captures risk likelihoods throughout 
a network but also assesses the resilience of the considered system. This paper’s methodology obtained 
required reliability parameters from empirical data and assessed the infrastructure availability of the 
West-German canal system. SC organisations can integrate the results to optimise their procurement 
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strategies, namely the trade-off between supplier reliability and inventory holding costs and risk 
mitigation strategies. Moreover, investments into reliability enhancement (~risk mitigations) can be 
prioritised based on their expected effect on the infrastructure availability depending on the network 
configuration and given time scope. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows the feasibility of applying methods from Reliability Theory and SC Reliability to derive 
a quantitative indicator using publicly available data. The methodology is capable of capturing network 
and time dynamics that can be used in the SC risk assessment and allow companies to prepare mitigation 
strategies like adjusting stock-levels or reserving additional capacities in different modes of transport in 
accordance to a quantitative measure. The model can be generalised for the European Inland Waterway 
Transportation System. Further models from Reliability Theory and SC Reliability can extend the 
assessment by adding environmental parameters (see Ebeling, 2017). 
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